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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
At issue in this consolidated appeal are the standards a
district court applies when deciding whether to certify a
settlement-only class, approve a class settlement, and approve
class counsel’s petition for attorneys’ fees.  More specifically,
we are presented with challenges to the District Court’s orders
granting final approval of a $121,800,000 settlement and a
$28,000,000 settlement, as well as to the District Court’s order
approving an award of $29,500,000 for attorneys’ fees and
expenses in conjunction with the larger of the two settlements.
Appellants are members of the settlement class in one or both of
the settlements who objected to various aspects of the settlement
agreements prior to the District Court granting final approval of
those agreements.  Appellees are the settling parties, consisting
of the plaintiffs, settling defendants, and intervenor attorneys
general in one settlement, and the plaintiffs and settling
defendants in the other settlement.  Because we conclude that
the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and (b) were satisfied with respect to both
settlement classes and that both settlements were fair under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), we will affirm the
District Court’s orders granting final approval of both
settlements.  We will also affirm the District Court’s order
granting attorneys’ fees because we conclude that the District
Court acted within its discretion in awarding a reasonable fee.
I.  Background
The origins of this case date back to October 2004 when
the New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, filed a civil
Judge Faith S. Hochberg initially presided over the1
consolidated cases; however, Chief Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
replaced her on January 3, 2007, due to her recusal.
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complaint against the insurance broker Marsh & McLennan
(Marsh) in New York state court, alleging that Marsh had
solicited fixed bids from insurance companies and had then
received improper payments for directing customers to those
companies.  In November 2004, a multi-state group consisting
of twelve attorneys general and several state insurance
departments began investigating the alleged bid rigging and
steering activities of brokers and insurers in the property and
casualty insurance industry.  Private parties commenced
numerous putative class actions in federal courts across the
country as well.
On February 17, 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation consolidated these private civil actions from multiple
jurisdictions under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and transferred the cases
to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
for pretrial proceedings.   In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,1
360 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2005).  The plaintiffs claimed
a vast conspiracy between some of the nation’s largest insurance
brokers (the Broker Defendants) and insurance carriers (the
Insurer Defendants) involving bid rigging and allocating or
steering customers to defeat competition in the insurance market
in exchange for high brokerage commissions.  The District
Court initially severed the various actions and realigned them
into two consolidated dockets – one consolidated case pertaining
to property and casualty commercial insurance (the Commercial
13
Case) and the other consolidated case pertaining to employee
benefits insurance (the Employee Benefits Case).  See In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 2850607, at *2 (D.N.J.
Oct. 3, 2006).
The plaintiffs in the Commercial Case are a proposed
class of businesses, individuals, and public entities who,
between August 26, 1994 and September 1, 2005, engaged the
services of the Broker Defendants to obtain advice with respect
to the procurement or renewal of commercial property and
casualty insurance and entered into or renewed an insurance
policy with the Insurer Defendants.  The plaintiffs in the
Employee Benefits Case are both employers who utilized the
services of the Broker Defendants to obtain group insurance
coverage from the Insurer Defendants for their employees as
part of their employee benefits plans and employees who
obtained insurance from the Insurer Defendants through their
employers’ benefits plans.
In August 2005, the plaintiffs filed separate consolidated
amended complaints in the Commercial Case and in the
Employee Benefits Case.  The plaintiffs in the Commercial Case
alleged that “[t]he Broker Defendants and Insurer Defendants
engaged in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and
eliminate competition in the sale of insurance by coordinating
and rigging bids for insurance policies, allocating insurance
markets and customers and raising, maintaining or stabilizing
premium prices above competitive levels.”  (Corrected First
Consolidated Am. Commercial Class Action Compl. ¶ 1.)  The
plaintiffs in the Employee Benefits case alleged that the Broker
Defendants and Insurer Defendants
Additionally, the employee-plaintiffs in the Employee2
Benefits Case asserted claims against the Insurer Defendants for
breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(2).
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“have conspired to manipulate the insurance
market through undisclosed profit-sharing
agreements and kickbacks in an effort to capture
larger market shares and profits to the detriment
of their unwitting clients and insureds.  Although
the Broker Defendants are hired to find the best
insurance coverage at the lowest price, the Insurer
Defendants pay the Broker Defendants
undisclosed or inadequately disclosed Contingent
Commissions, Communication Fees, and other
compensation so that the Broker Defendants will
steer their clients to them.”
(Corrected First Consolidated Am. Employee Benefits Class
Action Compl. ¶ 1.)
The plaintiffs in both the Commercial Case and the
Employee Benefits Case brought claims against the Broker and
Insurer Defendants for violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)- (d), the antitrust laws of forty-
eight states and the District of Columbia, and state common law
duties (i.e., unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty).2
The plaintiffs in both cases sought restitution, compensatory,
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punitive and treble damages, disgorgement, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
After the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaints,
the defendants filed motions to dismiss the federal claims in
both cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that the facts alleged in the complaints were insufficient
to state a cause of action for a Sherman Act or RICO violation.
Almost a year later, on October 3, 2006, the District Court
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action as to the Sherman Act and RICO claims, but did
so without prejudice and gave leave to the plaintiffs to amend
their pleadings.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL
2850607 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2006).  Subsequently, the plaintiffs
filed a supplemental statement of particularity in each case for
their federal antitrust claims and an amended case statement for
their RICO claims.  The defendants renewed their motions to
dismiss these claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  On April 5,
2007, the District Court once again granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss these claims, without prejudice, and gave the
plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings.  In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1062980 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2007).  Not
long thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Complaint in the Commercial Case and Employee Benefits
Case, and the defendants again renewed their motions to dismiss
the federal claims.  On August 31, 2007 and September 28,
2007, the District Court dismissed the Sherman Act claims and
RICO claims in both cases on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and, this
time, did so with prejudice.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,
2007 WL 2533989 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2007); In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 2892700 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007).
The Zurich Defendants are a group of insurers3
comprised of Zurich Financial Services, Zurich American
Insurance Company, Steadfast Insurance Company, Fidelity and
Deposit Company of Maryland, Empire Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, American Guarantee and Liability
Insurance Company, Empire Indemnity Insurance Company, and
Assurance Company of America.
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A.  The Zurich Settlement
In August 2005, the Zurich Defendants were added to the
Commercial Case putative class action.   At the same time as the3
litigation was proceeding, the Zurich Defendants were also the
subject of investigations conducted by various state attorneys
general and state departments of insurance stemming from the
same alleged practices in the marketing and sale of commercial
insurance.  On October 14, 2005, the Zurich Defendants and the
plaintiffs entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
which set forth the principal terms of a settlement of the claims
against the Zurich Defendants.  Specifically, the MOU
established that any claims arising out of transactions with the
Zurich Defendants from August 26, 1994 through September 1,
2005 would be resolved by the settlement and that, in return, the
Zurich Defendants would establish a $100,000,000 settlement
fund for the benefit of the Settlement Class.  The Settlement
Class included
“all individuals or entities, who during the
Settlement Class Period, engaged the services of
(i) one of the Broker Defendants or any subsidiary
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or affiliate of a Broker Defendant in connection
with a Settlement Class Policy Purchase from any
Zurich Insurer, any Insurer Defendant or any
insurance company that is not an affiliate or
subsidiary of a Zurich Insurer, or (ii) any other
broker . . . in connection with a Settlement Class
Policy Purchase from any Zurich Insurer.”
The MOU was subject to the completion of full
confirmatory discovery and the plaintiffs reserved the right to
terminate the MOU if, following completion of the confirmatory
discovery, they reasonably and in good faith did not believe the
terms of the settlement were fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The
MOU was also contingent upon the successful resolution of the
ongoing state investigations and the successful negotiation and
execution of a stipulation of settlement between the Zurich
Defendants and the plaintiffs.
On March 20, 2006, the Zurich Defendants reached an
agreement (Multi-State Agreement) with ten states – California,
Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia – which
resolved the investigations of the attorneys general in those
states against the Zurich Defendants.  At the same time, the
Zurich Defendants reached a Regulatory Settlement Agreement
with fifteen state departments of insurance, which contained
provisions that mirrored those contained in the Multi-State
Agreement and resolved the investigations of the insurance
departments in those various states against the Zurich
It is unclear from the record which states participated in4
the Regulatory Settlement Agreement.
The value of private class action lawsuits occurring5
concurrently with, or following from, state attorney general
investigations has been the subject of scholarly debate.  See,
e.g., John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson
Miller, Class Action “Cops”:  Public Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1441 (2005); “FTC
Workshop,” Class Actions as an Alternative to Regulation: The
Unique Challenges Presented by Multiple Enforcers and
Follow-On Lawsuits, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1311 (2005).
Critics of concurrent private class action lawsuits and
government investigations, in which private lawyers and
attorneys general work together, claim that the practice may
transform the office of the attorney general into a money-
making apparatus where private attorneys repeatedly take on
projects with the government in order to gain access to its
investigative findings and succeed in lucrative class action
lawsuits.  On the other hand, supporters of partnerships between
attorneys general and private class action attorneys argue that
class action suits fill the gaps resulting from insufficient
18
Defendants.   Under the terms of the Multi-State Agreement, the4
Zurich Defendants agreed to provide $51,700,000 in restitution
to the Settlement Class, which would supplement the settlement
relief to be provided pursuant to any final settlement agreement
reached by the parties and would be distributed to the Settlement
Class in accordance with the plan of allocation set forth in such
a settlement agreement.5
government regulation and enforcement, and help to deter
industry bad behavior.  Proponents also claim that working with
attorneys general creates a higher level of political
accountability for private attorneys, and that the partnership
method is an efficient means of sharing information between the
government and the private attorneys.
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On March 27, 2006, the Zurich Defendants executed a
separate agreement with the attorneys general in the states of
New York, Connecticut, and Illinois (Three-State Agreement),
which resolved the investigations against the Zurich Defendants
in those states.  The Three-State Agreement required the Zurich
Defendants to establish an $88,000,000 settlement fund to
provide relief to a group of policyholders specified in the Three-
State Agreement.  Any distributions made pursuant to the Three-
State Agreement were to be separate from those made pursuant
to any final settlement agreement reached by the parties and the
Multi-State Agreement.
On July 26, 2006, following the resolution of the state
investigations, the Zurich Defendants entered into a Stipulation
of Settlement with the plaintiffs (Zurich Settlement Agreement).
The terms of the Zurich Settlement Agreement provided that the
Zurich Defendants would pay $100,000,000 to the policyholders
who meet the definition of the Settlement Class; however,
because some of the potential Settlement Class Members were
also eligible to seek relief under the separate Three-State
Agreement, the Zurich Settlement Agreement allowed the
Zurich Defendants to initially create a fund in the amount of
$70,100,000 while designating the remaining $29,900,000 for
As the attorneys general explain, “[m]ost insurance6
customers structure their insurance coverage in three tiers[:] a
level of self-insurance, a level of primary insurance, and one or
more levels of excess insurance.  The class includes those
persons who bought the primary and excess insurance from the
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policyholders who qualify as Settlement Class Members but opt
to claim reimbursement under the Three-State Agreement
instead of the Zurich Settlement Agreement.  Only if the Zurich
Defendants failed to disburse at least $29,900,000 through the
Three-State Agreement (all of which would go to policyholders
who were eligible for relief under the Zurich Settlement
Agreement) would the Zurich Defendants be required to fund
the balance to the Settlement Class fund.  Thus, the Zurich
Defendants were required to pay $70,100,000 under the terms of
the Zurich Settlement Agreement and $51,700,000 under the
terms of the Multi-State Agreement for a total fund of
$121,800,000 for the Settlement Class Members, while
$29,900,000 of the amount designated for the Settlement Class
in the MOU would be used to fund the $88,000,000 award
established by the Three-State Agreement.
Under the terms of the Zurich Settlement Agreement,
51.7% of the settlement fund is allotted to Zurich policyholders
who purchased excess casualty insurance during the 2001 to
2004 time period, while Zurich policyholders who purchased
other lines of commercial insurance, or who purchased excess
casualty policies in other time periods, are allotted 33.9% of the
settlement fund, and those Settlement Class Members who are
not Zurich policyholders are allotted 9% of the settlement fund.6
defendant brokers.”
Additionally, a total of 1,067 potential Settlement Class7
Members filed timely exclusions, opting out of the Zurich
Settlement Agreement.
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The Zurich Defendants also agreed to separately pay any
administration and distribution costs associated with the Zurich
Settlement Agreement.
On November 8, 2006, the District Court entered an order
preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class and preliminarily
approving the proposed Zurich Settlement Agreement.  The
District Court set January 11, 2007 as a deadline for filing any
objections to the Zurich Settlement Agreement and scheduled a
fairness hearing for January 26, 2007.  Pursuant to the District
Court’s order, an administrator mailed notice of the proposed
settlement to over 3,790,000 Settlement Class Members and also
published notice of the fairness hearing in multiple periodicals,
including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, USA
Today, Business Insurance Magazine, Risk Management
Magazine, and the newspaper with the largest circulation in each
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.  The
administrator also established a website and toll-free number to
provide details of the proposed settlement and offer assistance
to the Settlement Class Members.
A total of fifteen potential Settlement Class Members
filed timely objections to the proposed Zurich Settlement
Agreement.   The objections pertained to the sufficiency of the7
The attorneys general who participated in the Multi-State8
Agreement filed a motion to intervene in the litigation in support
of the approval of the Zurich Settlement Agreement, and on
September 18, 2006, the District Court granted this motion.
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notice, scope of the release and bar order, requirements for
submitting claims forms, procedures for requesting exclusion,
Plan of Allocation, class certification, and attorneys’ fees.  At
the scheduled fairness hearing before the District Court, eight of
the objectors were represented by counsel; however, Van
Enterprises, Inc. (Van Enterprises), one of the current
appellants, was not among the objectors who appeared before
the District Court, despite having filed a Notice of Appearance.
In addition to Class Counsel, the Zurich Defendants, and eight
of the objectors, a representative from the Office of the Attorney
General of Texas appeared at the fairness hearing on behalf of
the intervening attorneys general.8
On February 16, 2007, the District Court issued an
opinion granting the Zurich Defendants’ and the plaintiffs’
motion for final approval of the settlement and dismissing, with
prejudice, the Zurich Defendants from the litigation.  In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 542227 (D.N.J. Feb. 16,
2007) (Zurich Settlement Final Approval Opinion).  In
explaining its decision to grant final approval of the settlement,
the District Court chose not to summarize each of the individual
challenges raised by the objectors, but it did discuss the general
categories of objections that were raised and dismissed each of
these types of objection.  After rejecting all of the objections, the
District Court certified the Settlement Class, finding that it met
The plaintiffs asked the District Court to consider only9
whether the proposed class met the standards set forth in Rule
23(b)(3) and not to consider whether Rule 23(b)(2) was
satisfied.
When these individual amounts are added together, the10
total is only $29,910,000 and thus is $40,000 short of the
requested fee of $29,950,000.  The parties do not address this
discrepancy.
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all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3),  and approved9
the Zurich Settlement Agreement, finding that all of the fairness
requirements of Rule 23(e) were met.
Additionally, the Zurich Defendants agreed with the
plaintiffs to pay up to $29,950,000 for attorneys’ fees, expense
reimbursements, and incentive awards for the named plaintiffs,
which would not be subtracted from the Settlement Class fund.
The parties also agreed that if the District Court granted less
than the requested fees and expenses or if this amount was later
reduced, the Zurich Defendants – not the Settlement Class
Members – would be entitled to the difference in amount.  Class
Counsel filed a motion for an award of fees in the District Court,
requesting that the District Court distribute the $29,950,000 as
follows: “$3,957,000 for reimbursement of litigation expenses;
$150,000 for payment of incentive awards to fifteen Plaintiffs;
and $25,803,000 for attorneys fees incurred in the prosecution
of this litigation.”   Various Settlement Class Members filed10
objections in opposition to the motion for an award of fees.  The
objections challenged the value of benefits to Settlement Class
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Members created by Class Counsel in light of the involvement
of the attorneys general, the inclusion of time spent on non-
Zurich Settlement matters in the calculation of the lodestar,
Class Counsel’s performance of their gatekeeper function, and
the overall amount of the fees.  On June 5, 2007, the District
Court approved the requested fee award, rejecting all of the
objections.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL
1652303 (D.N.J. June 5, 2007) (Zurich Settlement Attorneys’
Fees Opinion).
The following objectors filed timely notices of appeal
from the District Court’s order granting the settling parties’
motion for final approval of the settlement: Shapiro & Lodwick
Co., LPA, Sports & Spine Physical Therapy, Inc., Irene Pekoe,
Hoffman Legal Group, LLC, Lacy Redd and Cross & Sir
(07-1759); Romero General Construction Group (07-1763); Dan
C.D. Sturdevant (07-1769); Van Enterprises, Inc. (07-1779);
Iaad O., Inc. (Trustee of 8 Pacific Street Trust) and Zorkess LLC
(07-1786); Emerald Financial Group, Inc. (07-1793); Palomar
Grading and Paving, Inc. (07-1796); and Harold Folsom Jensen
(07-1826).
The following objectors filed timely notices of appeal
from the District Court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees and
expenses: Van Enterprises, Inc. (07-2935); Iaad O., Inc. (Trustee
of 8 Pacific Street Trust) and Zorkess LLC (07-2957); Shapiro
& Lodwick Co., LPA and Sports & Spine Physical Therapy, Inc.
(07-3037); Lacy Redd and Cross & Sir (07-3038); Irene Pekoe
and Hoffman Legal Group, LLC (07-3039); Romero General
Construction Corp. (07-3040); Dan C.D. Sturdevant (07-3042);
Appellants Shapiro & Lodwick Co., LPA; Sports &11
Spine Physical Therapy, Inc.; Irene Pekoe; Hoffman Legal
Group, LLC; Lacy Redd; Cross & Sir; Iaad O., Inc.; and Zorkess
LLC jointly filed one appellate brief.  In addressing arguments
presented by this group, we will refer to them as the
Iaad/Zorkess objectors.  Appellant Van Enterprises submitted its
own appellate brief; therefore, we will identify arguments
presented in this brief by referring to Van Enterprises.  The
remaining appellants filed a motion to adopt the briefs submitted
on behalf of the Iaad/Zorkess objectors and Van Enterprises.
The Gallagher Defendants are a group of insurance12
brokers comprised of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., Arthur J.
Gallagher Risk Management Services, Inc., and Gallagher
Benefit Services, Inc.  The Gallagher Defendants remained
parties to both the Commercial Case and the Employee Benefits
25
Emerald Financial Group, Inc., Palomar Grading and Paving,
Inc., and Harold Folsom Jensen (07-3041).11
Through various consolidations, the appeals of these
objectors from both the District Court’s final approval order and
its attorneys’ fees order have been joined together.  Altogether,
there are sixteen consolidated appeals related to the Zurich
Settlement.
B.  The Gallagher Settlement
In December 2004, the Gallagher Defendants were added
to the class action litigation.   The Gallagher Defendants were12
Case after the District Court created two distinct dockets for the
class action litigation.
It is unclear from the record whether the Gallagher13
Defendants entered into similar agreements with other states or
were able to  resolve all of the state investigations that were
pending against them through these agreements.
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also subject to ongoing investigations by state attorneys general
and state insurance departments for possible anticompetitive
activities.  On May 18, 2005, the Gallagher Defendants, whose
principal place of business and headquarters are located in
Illinois, entered into an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance
with the Attorney General of Illinois and the Director of the
Illinois Division of Insurance, and a Stipulation and Consent
Order with the Director of the Illinois Division of Insurance.
Under the terms of these agreements, the Gallagher Defendants
voluntarily implemented various business reforms and
transferred $26,962,500 into a fund from which amounts were
distributed to certain qualifying Gallagher customers.13
In April 2005, the Gallagher Defendants began settlement
agreement negotiations with the plaintiffs and, more than a year
and a half later, on December 29, 2006, the parties entered into
a Stipulation of Settlement (Gallagher Settlement Agreement).
Several amendments to the Gallagher Settlement Agreement
were filed in the following months, one of which included the
submission of a Plan of Allocation.  The proposed Gallagher
Settlement Agreement called for the creation of a $28,000,000
settlement fund to be paid to insureds who fell within the
27
definition of the Settlement Class and was intended to “resolve
all claims that have been, or could have been, asserted in this
action by Plaintiffs against the Gallagher Defendants.”  The
Settlement Class was defined as “all individuals or entities” who
“purchase[d] or renew[ed] commercial insurance, or reinsurance
thereof, obtained through engaging the services of the Gallagher
Defendants” or any Broker Defendant during the class period,
and “all individuals or entities” that “were employers providing
employee benefits insurance” and employees receiving
“employee benefits insurance” through an employer sponsored
plan that was obtained through the Gallagher Defendants or any
Broker Defendant during the class period.  (Gallagher App. 409-
10.)  For purposes of allocation, the Settlement Class was
divided into six separate claimant groups:
“Commercial Class members who purchased or
renewed commercial insurance either through a
Gallagher Entity (‘Commercial Direct Claimants’)
or a Commercial Broker Defendant (‘Commercial
Conspiracy Claimants’), Employer members of
the Employee Benefits Class who purchased or
renewed employee benefits insurance either
through a Gallagher Entity (‘Employer Direct
Claimants’) or an Employee Benefit Broker
Defendant (‘Employer Conspiracy Claimants’),
and all Employee members of the Employee
Benefits Class who purchased or renewed
employee benefits insurance either through a
Gallagher Entity (‘Employee Direct Claimants’)
or through an Employee Benefits Broker
Defendant (‘Employee Conspiracy Claimants’).”
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Thus the claimant groups were categorized based on the type of
insurance involved and whether the insurance was purchased
through the Gallagher Defendants or another Broker Defendant.
Under the Plan of Allocation, the fund was to be distributed
among the claimant groups as follows: 68% to Commercial
Direct Claimants, 13.2% to Commercial Conspiracy Claimants,
3.6% to Employer Direct Claimants, 0.5% to Employer
Conspiracy Claimants, 13.3% to Employee Direct Claimants,
and 1.4% to Employee Conspiracy Claimants.
In addition to establishing a settlement fund, the proposed
Gallagher Settlement Agreement also required the Gallagher
Defendants to make certain changes to their alleged business
practices – such as prohibitions on accepting contingent
compensation, “pay to play” arrangements, “bid rigging”
arrangements, reinsurance leveraging, and inappropriate use of
wholesale insurance brokers – and to make certain disclosures
to customers and  implement certain training for its employees.
The Gallagher Defendants also agreed to pay the administration
and distribution costs associated with the Gallagher Settlement
Agreement.
On April 13, 2007, the District Court entered an order
preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class and preliminarily
approving the Gallagher Settlement Agreement.  The District
Court set June 29, 2007 as the deadline for the filing of
exclusions and objections to the proposed Gallagher Settlement
Agreement and scheduled a fairness hearing for July 24, 2007.
Pursuant to the District Court’s order, the administrator mailed
notice of the proposed Gallagher Settlement Agreement to over
288,000 potential Settlement Class Members and also published
In addition, the District Court also received 206 timely14
requests for exclusion from the proposed Gallagher Settlement
Agreement.
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notice of the Gallagher Settlement Agreement twice in The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today, once in
Business Insurance Magazine and Risk Management Magazine,
and once in the newspaper with the largest circulation in each of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia.  The administrator
also established a website and toll-free hotline to provide
material relevant to the proposed Gallagher Settlement
Agreement.
Only two Settlement Class Members filed objections to
the Gallagher Settlement Agreement.   The objections pertained14
to the amount of the settlement, requirements of the settlement
claim form, the allocation of the settlement, and whether the
requirements of class certification were satisfied.  One of the
two objectors, appellant Van Enterprises – who also objected to
the Zurich Settlement – failed to appear at the fairness hearing
despite having filed a Notice of Intention to Appear.  The
District Court issued an order on September 4, 2007, granting
the Gallagher Defendants’ and plaintiffs’ motion for final
approval of the settlement and dismissing the Gallagher
Defendants from the litigation with prejudice, determining that
all of the objections lacked merit and concluding that the
Settlement Class could be certified and the Gallagher Settlement
Agreement could be approved consistent with the Rule 23
As in the Zurich Settlement, the plaintiffs asked the15
District Court to consider only whether the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) were met.
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requirements.   In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL15
2589950 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2007) (Gallagher Settlement Final
Approval Opinion).
Separately, the Gallagher Defendants agreed to pay up to
$8,885,000 for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees, litigation
expenses, and incentive awards for each of the twenty-five
named plaintiffs.  These fees were not to be deducted from the
$28,000,000 settlement fund.  No party objected to the petition
for fees, and the District Court approved it.
Van Enterprises filed a timely notice of appeal from the
District Court’s order granting the motion for final approval of
the settlement (07-3687) and is the only objector that remains in
this appeal.
II.  Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction over the Sherman Act
and RICO claims, which involved federal questions, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and had supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims, which arose out of the same common nucleus
of operative facts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Each of the
three decisions of the District Court that is under consideration
was a final order and we have jurisdiction to review them
We consolidated the appeals from the Zurich Settlement16
and the Gallagher Settlement for purposes of oral argument and
disposition.
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   “We review a class certification16
order for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court’s
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The decision of
whether to approve a proposed settlement of a class action is left
to the sound discretion of the district court.”  In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283,
299 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We
review a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of
discretion, taking into consideration whether the district court
employed the proper legal standards, followed the proper
procedures, and made findings of fact that are not clearly
erroneous.  In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722,
727 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.  Analysis of the Final Approval of the
Settlements and the Award of Fees
We begin our analysis with an overview of the standards
for certifying a settlement class and approving a class action
settlement.  Next, we review the District Court’s decisions in
both the Zurich Settlement and the Gallagher Settlement and
consider the arguments that the objectors raise with respect to
each of these decisions.  Finally, we provide an overview of the
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standards for approving an award of attorneys’ fees, and we
review the District Court’s decision granting Class Counsel’s
petition for an award of fees in the Zurich Settlement, taking
into consideration the arguments that the objectors raise on
appeal.
A.  Requirements for Approving Class Settlements
In order to approve a class settlement agreement, a
district court must determine that the requirements for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)
are met and must determine that the settlement is fair to the class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  As the Supreme
Court has made clear:
“Confronted with a request for settlement-only
class certification, a district court need not inquire
whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems, for the
proposal is that there be no trial.  But other
specifications of [Rule 23] – those designed to
protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or
overbroad class definitions – demand undiluted,
even heightened, attention in the settlement
context.”
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)
(citation omitted).  “[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e)
controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and
permitting class designation despite the impossibility of
litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed.”  Id.
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at 621.  Thus, it is important to “apply[] the class certification
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) separately from [the]
fairness determination under Rule 23(e).”  In re Prudential Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d at 308.
“The requirements of [Rule 23] (a) and (b) are designed
to insure that a proposed class has ‘sufficient unity so that absent
class members can fairly be bound by decisions of class
representatives.’”  Id. at 309 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
621).  Under Rule 23(a), the prerequisites to class certification
are:
“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.  If all of the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a class action may be
maintained if the standards set forth in Rule 23(b) are satisfied
as well.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).  Rule 23(b)(3) requires “the court
[to] find[] that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Amchem, 521
U.S. at 618 (“Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the
‘settlement only’ class has become a stock device.”).  The
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“[f]actual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.  In other
words, to certify a class the district court must find that the
evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to
meet the requirements of Rule 23.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 320.  Accordingly, “[c]lass
certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met.”  Id.
at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Even if it has satisfied the requirements for certification
under Rule 23, a class action cannot be settled without the
approval of the court and a determination that the proposed
settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.”  In re Prudential
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (stating that a district court may approve
a proposed settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate”).  In Girsh v. Jepson, our
Court articulated nine factors to be considered when
determining the fairness of a proposed settlement:
“‘(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks
of establishing liability; (5) the risks of
establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining
the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of
the defendants to withstand a greater judgment;
(8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement
fund in light of the best possible recovery; (9) the
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range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to
a possible recovery in light of all the attendant
risks of litigation.’”
521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).  “[W]here settlement negotiations precede
class certification, and approval for settlement and certification
are sought simultaneously, we require district courts to be even
more scrupulous than usual when examining the fairness of the
proposed settlement.”  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.,
391 F.3d 516, 534 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
B.  Challenges to the Approval
of the Zurich Settlement
1.  The District Court’s Analysis
The District Court granted final approval of the Zurich
Settlement after concluding that the Rule 23 requirements were
satisfied.  Specifically, the District Court determined that the
proposed Zurich Settlement Class met the standards established
by Rule 23(a) because the large, nationwide class of plaintiffs
“easily satisfies the numerosity requirement” of subsection
(a)(1); the “many common questions of law and fact” satisfy the
commonality requirement of subsection (a)(2); the claims of the
named plaintiffs are “indistinguishable” from those made on
behalf of the settlement class and “encompass[] identical
allegations” arising “from the same course of action taken by the
Zurich Defendants,” which satisfies the typicality requirement
of subsection (a)(3); and the dual components of the adequacy
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of representation requirement of subsection (a)(4) are satisfied
because the attorneys representing the named plaintiffs are
“clearly ‘well qualified and experienced class action attorneys,’”
and the interests of the named plaintiffs “are not antagonistic to
those of the absent class members.”  Zurich Settlement Final
Approval Opinion at *13-15.
The District Court also concluded that the standards of
Rule 23(b)(3) were met, finding that the predominance
requirement was satisfied due to the “identical claims of both
the named Plaintiffs and the absent class members aris[ing] from
the same set of facts regarding the alleged collusive and
anticompetitive behavior of the Zurich Defendants,” and the
superiority requirement was satisfied because litigating all of
these claims “in one action is . . . far more desirable than
numerous separate actions litigating the same issues.”  Id. at
*16.  Thus, the District Court concluded that the class
established by the Zurich Settlement Agreement met all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3).  The District Court noted
that Van Enterprises had asserted in its written objection that the
Settlement Class “lacks commonality, typicality, adequacy of
representation and a predominance of common issues,” but the
District Court rejected these contentions because Van
Enterprises “provide[d] no cogent argument or legal basis to
support these assertions, failing to reference a single case, from
this or any other Court, that might explain its allegations.”  Id.
at *17.
The District Court also considered the fairness of the
Zurich Settlement Agreement and found that none of the Girsh
“factors suggest[s] that the proposed settlement should not be
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approved.”  Id. at *4.  The District Court found that the first five
Girsh factors “overwhelmingly weigh in favor of approval of
[the] settlement.”  Id.  As to the first factor – complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation – the District Court
determined that “this case involves highly complex legal and
factual issues . . . [that] would undoubtedly [lead to] a costly and
lengthy [litigation] process for all parties” and that “[t]his
proposed settlement provides an immediate benefit to the
Plaintiffs.”  Id.  Applying the second factor, the District Court
“conclude[d] that the small number of objections by Class
Members to the settlement award, more specifically, to the
calculation of the settlement award and damages resulting from
the conduct of the Zurich Defendants, strongly weighs in favor
of approval.”  Id. at *5.  The District Court determined that,
under the third factor, the stage of proceedings and the amount
of discovery completed weighed in favor of settlement because,
“[b]ased upon the amount of time Counsel expended in
negotiations and the extent of the discovery process, . . . Counsel
had a thorough appreciation for the merits of the case prior to
settlement.”  Id. at *6.  With respect to the fourth and fifth
factors, the District Court concluded that the risks of
establishing both liability and damages weighed in favor of
settlement because “[t]his case involves difficult factual and
legal issues which would have translated into protracted
litigation and accumulating expenses, in both time and money.”
Id.  The District Court concluded its Girsh analysis by
As we noted in In re Prudential Insurance Co. America17
Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 323 (3d
Cir. 1998), depending on the facts of a given case, “it may be
useful to expand the traditional Girsh factors to include, when
appropriate,” additional factors “that bear on the ability to assess
the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and
individual damages,” as well as “the existence and probable
outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses; the
comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for
individual class or subclass members and the results achieved –
or likely to be achieved – for other claimants; whether class or
subclass members are accorded the right to opt out of the
settlement; whether any provisions for attorneys’ fees are
reasonable; and whether the procedure for processing individual
claims under the settlement is fair and reasonable.”  The
Prudential factors relevant here weigh in favor of the Zurich
Settlement.  For example, class members had a right to opt out,
and some did so, see Zurich Settlement Final Approval Opinion
at *5; the District Court found the claims processing procedure
fair and reasonable, see id. at *10, and we agree; and the
attorneys’ fees awarded in conjunction with the settlement are
reasonable, see infra Part III.D.
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determining that the final four factors weighed “slightly or
moderately in favor of approval.”  Id. at *8.17
Prior to certifying the class and approving the Zurich
Settlement, the District Court addressed objections regarding the
failure to utilize subclasses.  Certain objectors claimed that three
subclasses were necessary due to the allocation of funds under
The suggestion was to create three subclasses: Excess18
Claimants, Non-Excess Claimants, and Conspiracy Claimants.
See supra note 11.19
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the Zurich Settlement Agreement, and that each of these
subclasses was entitled to separate representation.   The District18
Court acknowledged that the use of subclasses is appropriate
where members of a class have “interests divergent from the rest
of the class,” but determined that the objectors here “failed to
raise, let alone describe, any divergent or antagonistic interests
between the three groups.”  Id. at *18.  The District Court also
noted that “[a] class need not be divided into subclasses merely
because different groups have alternative legal theories for
recovery, or because those groups have different factual bases
for relief.”  Id. at *17.  Therefore, the District Court rejected the
objection.
2.  The Objectors’ Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, there are two principal groups of objectors:
Van Enterprises, who submitted a brief on its own behalf, and
the Iaad/Zorkess objectors, who submitted a joint brief on behalf
of several objectors.   Van Enterprises presents numerous19
arguments in its opening brief before this Court.  Briefly stated,
Van Enterprises currently challenges the District Court’s
certification of the class, arguing that it failed to rigorously
analyze the Rule 23 requirements and, in particular, that the
Settlement Class is overbroad, resulting in a predominance of
individual issues as opposed to common ones.  Van Enterprises
Although Van Enterprises objected to the petition for20
attorneys’ fees and filed a notice of appeal from the District
Court’s order granting attorneys’ fees, it did not, on appeal, raise
any arguments related to the award of fees.
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also argues that the named plaintiffs lack standing because they
have not demonstrated an injury in fact.  Both Van Enterprises
and the Iaad/Zorkess objectors challenge the District Court’s
failure to utilize subclasses despite the allocation of the
settlement fund to various types of policyholders.  The
Iaad/Zorkess objectors also challenge the District Court’s award
of $29,950,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses.20
a.  Failure to Preserve Arguments on Appeal
At the outset, the plaintiffs assert that Van Enterprises
failed to properly preserve its arguments with respect to the
Zurich Settlement.  They contend that the arguments Van
Enterprises now raises on appeal were not preserved by Van
Enterprises’ written objection in the District Court, in which
Van Enterprises attempted to merely “incorporate by reference
into its objection every argument raised in every brief,
declaration and exhibit that was submitted in connection with
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, as well as the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”  In other words, the plaintiffs
argue that this “conclusory” written objection “simply cannot
serve to preserve for appeal the sprawling arguments it now
raises concerning certification of the Settlement Class.”  The
plaintiffs also point out that “Van failed to attend the Fairness
Hearing, during which it could have elaborated on its cryptic
The fact that Van Enterprises repeatedly refers to21
documents which the non-settling Broker and Insurer
Defendants in the Commercial Case litigation submitted to the
District Court is troubling.  We find it peculiar that Van
Enterprises’ interests are so closely aligned with the non-settling
defendants, but nonetheless we accept these arguments at face
value.
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arguments made entirely by reference.”  Thus, the plaintiffs
contend that the only arguments Van Enterprises preserved for
appeal pertain to the Plan of Allocation and the purported need
for subclasses.
Although Van Enterprises frequently cites submissions
to the District Court in the Commercial Case litigation – instead
of its own written objection – as support for the various
arguments it advances on appeal, Van Enterprises asserts that its
written objection preserved all of these arguments because the
objection “incorporated the motions, responses, briefs,
declarations and exhibits filed by the Plaintiffs and Defendants
concerning class certification of a litigation class.”  Van
Enterprises argues that the District Court erred by not
considering these “adversarial motions and briefing for a
Litigation Class despite emphatic requests from the non-settling
Defendants and Van Enterprises.”21
As an initial matter, although Van Enterprises did not
appear at the fairness hearing to argue its objections, its absence
from the hearing did not cause it to forfeit the objections it had
timely submitted to the District Court in written form.  Van
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Enterprises acted in accordance with the notice provided to the
potential Settlement Class Members, which stated that
attendance at the hearing was not necessary so long as an
objection was properly filed with the District Court by the
deadline:
“If you are a Settlement Class Member . . . and do
not exclude yourself from the Settlement Class,
you may object to the Zurich Settlement, any term
of the Zurich Settlement Agreement, the Plan of
Allocation or Plaintiffs’ application for attorneys’
fees and expenses.  Such objection must be in
writing and must provide evidence of your
membership in the Settlement Class.  The written
objection also should state the specific reason(s),
if any, for the objection, including any legal
support you wish to bring to the Court’s attention
and any evidence you wish to introduce in support
of the objection.  A written objection (and any
support for it) must be received by the Court and
the following counsel by no later than January 11,
2007.
* * *
If (and only if) you make a written objection to
the Zurich Settlement as set out above, you may
choose to speak – either in person or through an
attorney hired at your own expense – at the
hearing . . . the Court has set to consider whether
to approve the Zurich Settlement.  You are not
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required to attend the hearing.  Lack of attendance
at the hearing will not prevent the Court from
considering your objection.”
(Zurich App. 3077-79.)  Thus, while it was necessary for Van
Enterprises to provide the grounds for its objections in writing
in order to preserve its arguments for appeal, it was unnecessary
for it to appear at the hearing.
However, we are not obligated to entertain all of the
arguments that Van Enterprises presently advances.  “Absent
exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.”  Del. Nation v.
Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Harris
v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also
Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs of N.J., 919 F.2d 183,
196 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The matter of what questions may be taken
up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily
to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the
facts of individual cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For an issue to be preserved for appeal, a party “must
unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point and
in a manner that permits the court to consider its merits.”  Shell
Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir.
1999).  A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will
not suffice to preserve it for appeal, so “the crucial question
regarding waiver is whether defendants presented the argument
with sufficient specificity to alert the district court.”  Keenan v.
City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Frank
v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Particularly where important and complex issues of law are
Because Van Enterprises failed to appear before the22
District Court at the fairness hearing, Van Enterprises forfeited
the opportunity to zealously advocate its objections in person
and expound upon the challenges that it raised in its written
objection.  A practical consequence of Van Enterprises’ failure
to appear at the fairness hearing, combined with its submission
of a relatively sparse written objection, is that its grounds for
challenging the approval of the settlement were not well-
developed and, not surprisingly, were not persuasive to the
District Court.
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presented, a far more detailed exposition of argument is required
to preserve an issue.”).  Thus, the arguments that were properly
preserved for appeal are limited to those which Van Enterprises
presented with at least a minimum level of thoroughness to the
District Court through its written objection and, without the
existence of compelling circumstances, we need not entertain
challenges to the approval of the Zurich Settlement which were
not before the District Court.22
Turning to the substance of Van Enterprises’ written
objection, we are able to discern that Van Enterprises’ principal
challenges to the approval of the Zurich Settlement are that the
Settlement Class is overbroad – which impacts the Rule 23
requirements of commonality, typicality, and predominance of
common issues – and that antagonistic interests among the class
members exist such that, in the absence of separate subclasses,
the adequacy of representation requirement is not satisfied and
the Plan of Allocation is not fair.  (Zurich App. 2439.)  Van
Enterprises did not offer much support in its written objection
In total, Van Enterprises presented eighteen sub-23
arguments in its opening brief on appeal.  While we have
identified the objections that were preserved, we will not list all
of the current objections that were not preserved.
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to substantiate its argument that the Rule 23 requirements are
not satisfied, but rather posited that the Settlement Class should
not be certified unless the litigation class can properly be
certified, and thus Van Enterprises asserted that the District
Court needed to consider all of the filings in the class action
litigation that have a bearing on whether certification of the
litigation class is appropriate.  Van Enterprises also did not
substantiate its argument that subclasses were needed to ensure
a fair allocation of the settlement fund other than to say that the
Plan of Allocation treats various types of policyholders
differently.
Although Van Enterprises detracts from the credibility
and persuasiveness of its objections by presenting them in such
a conclusory fashion,  we nonetheless will credit its explicit
mention of the commonality, typicality, and predominance
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), as well as its brief
discussion of the need for subclasses – which touched on both
the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a) and
the fairness of the Plan of Allocation under Rule 23(e) – and
will consider these specific challenges on appeal.  But beyond
these objections, Van Enterprises has forfeited the opportunity
to challenge other aspects of the District Court’s decision to
approve the Zurich Settlement by failing to make any mention
of those arguments in its written objection.23
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The attorneys general argue that among the issues that
Van Enterprises has failed to preserve for appeal is its challenge
to the named plaintiffs’ standing.  The attorneys general assert
that the standing issue “was not addressed in Van’s original
objection. . . .  If Van had seriously believed there was an issue
of standing, it could have raised it at the District Court level.”
They also note that “[i]n the related ‘Gallagher’ settlement, Van
raised the [standing] argument and was denied by the same
District Judge as here.”
We agree that Van Enterprises’ objection is devoid of any
reference, express or implied, to the named plaintiffs’ standing
and there is no basis for construing the objection as containing
such a challenge.  In a somewhat telling statement, Van
Enterprises now argues that “no standing issues were addressed
by the Settling Parties and District Court in connection with [the
Zurich] Settlement Class.”  The likely explanation for the
absence of a standing analysis is that no challenge was made to
the plaintiffs’ standing and the District Court did not otherwise
discern a reason to include a discussion of the plaintiffs’
standing in its opinion.  That said, because “[s]tanding is a
threshold jurisdictional requirement, and we have an obligation
to examine our own jurisdiction and that of the district courts,”
we will briefly address whether the named plaintiffs have
standing.  Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399
F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Turning to the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of
standing, the Supreme Court has articulated three requirements:
47
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury
in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.’  Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of – the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before
the court.’  Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed
to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(internal citations and select quotation marks omitted).
Van Enterprises argues that “the named Plaintiffs do not
allege and have not shown that any of their policies were subject
to the improper use of contingent commission agreements,” and
thus they have not established an injury in fact.  Van Enterprises
contends that, at best, “Plaintiffs allege that the entire class paid
‘higher prices that arguably ensued in [the] entire industry’ as a
result of Defendants’ allegedly anticompetitive conduct directed
at some subset of Class Members.”
In response, the attorneys general assert that “at least
seven of the named plaintiffs purchased Zurich insurance
policies,” and that this “is sufficient to establish standing for
class certification purposes” because “[o]nce a named Plaintiff
has been shown to have standing and therefore [is] properly
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before the Court,” the focus shifts to “compliance with the
provisions of Rule 23.”  Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that
“because the Settlement Class is limited to those policyholders
with a ‘direct and immediate relationship’ to a Defendant co-
conspirator in this Action, and because all Settlement Class
Members purchased insurance at prices elevated by Defendants’
unlawful scheme, all members of the Settlement Class have
been injured by the anticompetitive conduct described in the
Complaint and therefore have standing.”  They add that “the
payment of contingent commissions drove up the costs of all
insurance policies” because “[t]hrough a process called
‘premium build-up’ the contingent commissions paid by insurers
were built into formulas used to derive all rates.”
Van Enterprises’ arguments must be rejected because it
is clear that the named plaintiffs alleged a concrete and
particularized injury in fact.  The plaintiffs alleged that they paid
supra-competitive prices for their insurance policies as a result
of the contingent commission arrangements and other
anticompetitive conduct of the Zurich Defendants.  This
increase in price constitutes a concrete injury in fact.  Moreover,
because the named plaintiffs purchased insurance policies from
the Zurich Defendants during the relevant class period, their
injuries are neither generalized nor speculative.  This is not to
say that the named plaintiffs have proven that they were injured
by the Zurich Defendants, but they are not required to prove
their injuries in order to establish that they are a proper party to
bring their claims before the court.  Additionally, the plaintiffs
alleged that the economic harm they suffered can be traced to
the Zurich Defendants’ conduct and these injuries can be
redressed by imposing liability on the Zurich Defendants.
There is no indication that Van Enterprises contests the24
District Court’s finding that the superiority requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) was satisfied and it is beyond dispute that no such
argument was preserved in Van Enterprises’ written objection.
Therefore, we will not address this aspect of Rule 23(b)(3).
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Therefore, we are satisfied that the case and controversy
requirement of Article III is met and that the named plaintiffs
had standing to bring this case.
b.  Challenges to Class Certification
Turning to the merits of Van Enterprises’ preserved
objections to class certification, Van argues that “[t]he District
Court failed to rigorously analyze the Rule 23 criteria before
certifying this Settlement Class.”  Although Van Enterprises
speaks in general terms about all of the Rule 23 requirements,
Van’s arguments are primarily directed at the predominance
component of Rule 23(b)(3).   Nonetheless, to the extent that24
Van Enterprises continues to argue that the commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) were not satisfied (as it did
in its written objection), we reject any such argument.  The
District Court correctly noted that “‘commonality does not
require an identity of claims or facts among class members’;
rather, ‘[t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with
the grievances of the prospective class.’”  Zurich Settlement
Final Approval Opinion at *13 (quoting Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 183 (3d Cir.
2001)).  Indeed, the District Court listed several common
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questions of law and fact before concluding that the
commonality requirement was satisfied.  We find no error in this
determination.  And with respect to the typicality requirement,
the District Court stated that “‘if the claims of the named
plaintiffs and class members involve the same conduct by the
defendant, typicality is established.’”  Id. at *14 (quoting
Newton, 259 F.3d at 183-84).  Based on this standard, the
District Court explained:
“Here, the claims made by named Plaintiffs and
those made on behalf of the Settlement Class
Members are indistinguishable, encompassing
identical allegations that the Zurich Defendants
violated RICO, federal and state antitrust laws,
and the common law obligation of fiduciary duty.
These claims arise in each case from the same
course of action taken by the Zurich Defendants.
Consequently, the named Plaintiffs’ claims are
typical of those brought by the Settlement Class
Members at large.”
Id.  We discern no error in this finding either.  Although we are
satisfied with the District Court’s analysis of the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), we think that Van
Enterprises’ challenge to the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) calls for a closer look.
As part of its challenge to the District Court’s finding of
predominance, Van Enterprises argues that “the Settling Parties
and the District Court did not address how antitrust injury could
be shown with common proof for this overbroad Settlement
None of these particular arguments was raised in Van25
Enterprises’ written objection.  Nonetheless, because of the
magnitude of this settlement – both in terms of the amount of
money involved and the number of persons affected – we will
exercise our discretion to consider these arguments.  The
significance of this litigation, in combination with our
independent obligation to ensure the fairness of the settlement
for absent class members, persuades us to entertain these newly
developed arguments on appeal.  But our decision to construe
liberally Van Enterprises’ written objection to encompass the
more detailed reasons now offered for its challenge to the
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Class that includes class members who did not purchase
insurance from any Insurer Defendant or who utilized a broker
who is not even alleged to be part of the conspiracy” and that
“[d]ue to the overbroad class definition, even the question of
whether there is an antitrust conspiracy under federal or state
law is not common to the class.”  Van Enterprises makes similar
arguments in the context of the plaintiffs’ RICO claim as well.
Briefly stated, Van Enterprises argues: “The Settling Parties and
the District Court did not address whether the named Plaintiffs
or Settlement Class members had standing to bring a RICO
claim, whether there was a uniform misrepresentation or
omission to the class, whether proximate causation and financial
loss were common to the class, or the applicability of the filed
rate doctrine.”  Through these arguments, Van Enterprises
attempts to demonstrate that common issues do not predominate
with respect to the antitrust claims and that “[i]ndividual
questions remain that would have to be separately
adjudicated.”25
predominance requirement should in no way be interpreted as
sanctioning Van Enterprises’ conduct.  For this reason, we
reiterate that Van Enterprises should have presented these
arguments to the District Court so that it could have
incorporated such considerations into its own analysis, and
ordinarily claims raised in this manner will be deemed waived.
Additionally, while we recognize that the District Court’s
discussion of the predominance requirement was not particularly
detailed, we think that its treatment of this requirement was
understandable given the conclusory objection that Van
Enterprises made to predominance.  The District Court’s
analysis, though brief, was more thorough than Van Enterprises’
objection on this point.
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The plaintiffs respond that “Van’s arguments regarding
common impact and common injury ignore that Plaintiffs’
claims and the Settlement Class Members’ claims are identically
predicated on the Zurich Defendants’ actions” and that, as a
result, “the district court’s finding of predominance was not an
abuse of discretion.”  The plaintiffs also argue that Van
Enterprises’ challenges to the merits of the claims “have no
relevance to the determination of whether to certify a settlement
class.”  To this argument, the attorneys general add that Van
Enterprises simply accuses the District Court of “not read[ing]
enough briefs, enough declarations, enough reports, enough
memoranda, enough cases or enough evidence to support
approval of class certification and settlement.”
The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he Rule
23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes
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are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation,” which imposes a standard “far more
demanding” than the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24.  Whereas “Rule 23(a)(2)’s
commonality element requires that the proposed class members
share at least one question of fact or law in common with each
other,” the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance element “requires that
common issues predominate over issues affecting only
individual class members.”  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust
Litig., 391 F.3d at 527-28.  Hence, we consider the Rule 23(a)
commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more
stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and
therefore deem it appropriate to “analyze the two factors
together, with particular focus on the predominance
requirement.”  Id. at 528; accord Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]here an
action is to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), the commonality
requirement is subsumed by the predominance requirement.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because class certification
is unsuitable where “proof of the essential elements of the cause
of action requires individual treatment,” Newton, 259 F.3d at
172, we will “examine the elements of plaintiffs’ claim through
the prism of Rule 23 to determine whether the District Court
properly certified the class,” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the District Court relied on its Rule 23(a)
commonality analysis in assessing the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  After setting forth general
principles about the predominance requirement, the District
Court, interpreting precedent from our Court, noted that
We do not read the District Court’s statement as26
implying that common issues necessarily predominate in every
antitrust case; such a proposition would be incorrect.  See In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 321-22 (“We
recognize the Supreme Court has observed that ‘[p]redominance
is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or
securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.’  But it does
not follow that a court should relax its certification analysis, or
presume a requirement for certification is met, merely because
a plaintiff’s claims fall within one of those substantive
categories.” (citation omitted)).  Rather we construe this
statement together with the District Court’s identification of
various issues in the present case that are common to the class.
In doing so, we interpret the District Court’s statement as
indicating that, in this case, given the common issues of law and
fact which stem from the conduct of the defendants, the
predominance requirement is necessarily met.
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“because the ‘clear[] focus’ of an antitrust class action is ‘on the
allegedly deceptive conduct of defendant’ and not on ‘the
conduct of individual class members,’ common issues
necessarily predominate.”   Zurich Settlement Final Approval26
Opinion at *15 (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.,
391 F.3d at 528).  The District Court then provided the
following explanation in support of finding the predominance
requirement satisfied:
“Here, as discussed in the sections on
commonality and typicality, the identical claims
of both the named Plaintiffs and the absent class
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members arise from the same set of facts
rega rd ing  the  a l leged  co llu s ive  and
anticompetitive behavior of the Zurich
Defendants.  Consequently, the predominance
requirement is satisfied.”
Id. at *16.  In its earlier discussion of the commonality
requirement, the District Court listed the following as examples
of the common questions of law and fact:
“(1) whether the Zurich Defendants entered into
a conspiracy to allocate the market for the sale of
insurance; (2) whether the Zurich Defendants’
alleged conspiracy had the purpose and effect of
unlawfully restraining competition in the
insurance industry; (3) whether the Zurich
Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act; (4) whether the Zurich Defendants’
conduct breached their fiduciary duty to their
clients; and (5) whether the actions of the Zurich
Defendants violated the RICO statute.”
Id. at *13.
Reading the District Court’s commonality and
predominance analyses together, as is appropriate in this
context, see In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d at
528, it is clear that the District Court identified several
significant – albeit broad – common issues, even if it did not
further refine its analysis by assessing the individual elements of
the plaintiffs’ claims.  However, as we indicated earlier, the
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District Court was not presented with a vigorous challenge to
the predominance requirement, which may have influenced its
decision not to provide a more thorough analysis of this issue.
In order to ensure that the District Court applied the correct legal
standard and acted within its discretion in certifying this class,
we will conduct a Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis for
ourselves, building on the foundation provided by the District
Court.
Because our task calls for us to “examine the elements of
plaintiffs’ claim through the prism of Rule 23,” In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation
marks omitted), we begin with the elements of the plaintiffs’
federal antitrust claim.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations.”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  “To
establish a violation of Section 1, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) concerted action by the defendants; (2) that produced anti-
competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic
markets; (3) that the concerted actions were illegal; and (4) that
it was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action.”
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co.,
998 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1993)).  The Supreme Court has
explained that Section 1 of the Sherman Act “‘does not prohibit
[all] unreasonable restraints of trade . . . but only restraints
effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy,’” and
therefore “‘[t]he crucial question’ is whether the challenged
anticompetitive conduct ‘stem[s] from independent decision or
from an agreement, tacit or express.’”  Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (citations omitted); see
Gordon, 423 F.3d at 207 (“The essence of a Section 1 claim is
the existence of an agreement.”).
Turning to the plaintiffs’ allegations, we consider
whether common questions of law and fact exist with respect to
each of these elements.  Because the first and third elements of
a Sherman Act violation focus on the conduct of the defendants,
we find that common questions abound with respect to whether
the defendants engaged in illegal, concerted action.  For
example, common questions relevant to these two elements
include whether the Zurich Defendants agreed with any of the
Broker Defendants to pay contingent commissions in exchange
for an allocation of a certain amount of business in the insurance
market, whether the Zurich Defendants conspired with any
Insurer Defendants to reduce competition and allocate the
market among a select group of insurers, whether the Zurich
Defendants agreed not to compete for other Insurer Defendants’
customers in return for incumbent protection of their own
customers, whether the Zurich Defendants shared a common
objective of reducing competition among the other Insurer
Defendants as opposed to merely engaging in parallel conduct,
whether there was a discernible division of the insurance market
which amounted to an illegal restraint of trade, and whether
these agreements constituted horizontal restraints of trade that
are per se illegal.  The second element of a Sherman Act
violation, which focuses on the effects of the defendants’
challenged conduct, also involves common questions in the
present case, including whether the Zurich Defendants’ actions
reduced competition for insurance, whether the Zurich
Defendants’ actions resulted in a consolidation of the insurance
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industry, and whether the Zurich Defendants’ actions produced
an increase in the cost of premiums for commercial insurance.
The fourth element of a Sherman Act violation, which
addresses whether the plaintiffs suffered an antitrust injury, is at
the center of Van Enterprises’ challenge to the District Court’s
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance finding.  In the context of class
certifications, we have stated that “impact often is critically
important for the purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance requirement because it is an element of the claim
that may call for individual, as opposed to common, proof.”  In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 311.
Accordingly, for purposes of class certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), “the task for plaintiffs . . . is to demonstrate that the
element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through
evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its
members.”  Id. at 311-12.  For this reason, although the fourth
element focuses on whether the plaintiffs were injured by the
defendants’ conduct, it may still involve common questions of
law and fact if proof of injury can be established on a class-wide
basis.
Van Enterprises argues that antitrust injury cannot be
proven on a class-wide basis because the Settlement Class
includes class members who did not purchase insurance from an
Insurer Defendant or utilize a Broker Defendant.  The plaintiffs
counter that antitrust injury is a question that is common to the
class because “Contingent Commissions . . . are included in each
insurer’s ratemaking formulas and are consequently ‘built’ into
every commercial premium for commercial insurance products,”
and “the conspiratorial conduct of all Defendants (including
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Zurich) reduced or eliminated competition for insurance
products, thereby raising the insurance premiums paid by
Plaintiffs and all members of the class.”  Thus, they argue that
all class members were injured by the Zurich Defendants’
anticompetitive conduct, even if the extent of their injuries
varied.  The attorneys general likewise argue that “[c]ontingent
commissions paid by insurers were built into the premiums
charged to members of the class which resulted in supra
competitive premium prices to insurance consumers,” and that
“[a]s a result of the Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and
unnamed class members have paid insurance premiums in
excess of what they would have paid had the Broker Defendants
acted in accordance with their fiduciary duties and their
representations to their clients.”
As the arguments of the plaintiffs and attorneys general
illustrate, whether the named plaintiffs and absent class
members were proximately injured by the conduct of the Zurich
Defendants is a question that is capable of proof on a class-wide
basis.  Contrary to Van Enterprises’ assertion, the Settlement
Class only includes policyholders who purchased insurance
directly from the Zurich Defendants and policyholders who
utilized one of the Broker Defendants, and therefore the
plaintiffs’ theory for proving antitrust injury would apply to all
of the class members.  Consequently, we are satisfied that the
element of antitrust injury – that is, the fact of damages – is
susceptible to common proof, even if the amount of damage that
each plaintiff suffered could not be established by common
proof.  Unlike in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation,
where the certification inquiry was set against the backdrop of
an impending trial, here we are not as concerned with
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“formulat[ing] some prediction” as to how this element of a
Sherman Act violation would “play out” at trial, 552 F.3d at 311
(internal quotation marks omitted), “for the proposal is that there
be no trial,”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, and instead our inquiry
into the element of antitrust injury is solely for the purpose of
ensuring that issues common to the class predominate over
individual ones.  As the foregoing analysis demonstrates,
common questions exist even with respect to the element of
antitrust injury and therefore any individual issues do not
overwhelm the common ones.  Because each of the elements of
a Sherman Act violation involves common questions of law and
fact, we conclude that common questions predominate over
individual ones with respect to the federal antitrust claim.
Next, we consider the essential elements of the plaintiffs’
RICO claim.  The RICO statute provides, in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
. . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  Establishing liability under this section of
the RICO statute “requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise
(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity,” plus an injury
to “business or property.”  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (footnote omitted); see Lum v. Bank of
Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under Section 1962(d),
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“[i]t is also unlawful for anyone to conspire to violate
§ 1962(c).”  Lum, 361 F.3d at 223.  Section 1961(1) of RICO
provides a list of the federal and state crimes which constitute
“racketeering activity” and includes mail and wire fraud, and
Section 1961(4) of RICO defines the term “enterprise” to
“include[] any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”
Proving the first element of a RICO violation in this case
would involve common questions about the activities of the
Zurich Defendants and, in particular, whether the Zurich
Defendants participated or engaged in conduct with other
Insurer Defendants and Broker Defendants.  The second element
also involves common questions of law and fact, namely
whether an enterprise of Broker Defendants and Insurer
Defendants existed (of which the Zurich Defendants were a
part) either as an association in fact or as a more formal
organization or entity.  Proving the third and fourth elements
would encompass common questions of law and fact as well,
including whether activities that constitute racketeering were
taking place through the enterprise (such as mail or wire fraud)
and whether these racketeering activities were recurring such
that a pattern could be established.  While establishing an injury
is not as conducive to common proof because it requires that a
plaintiff demonstrate harm to his property or business, for the
reasons already set forth in our discussion of the element of
antitrust impact, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs have
presented a plausible theory for proving a class-wide injury as
a result of the racketeering activities of the alleged enterprises
Again, “Non-Excess Claimants” refers to those27
policyholders who purchased a primary insurance policy from
or through one of the defendants whereas “Excess Claimants”
refers to those policyholders who purchased additional insurance
policies – in excess of their primary insurance coverage – from
or through one of the defendants.
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at issue here.  Thus, each element of the alleged RICO violation
involves common questions of law and fact.
Based on our analysis of the essential elements of the
plaintiffs’ federal claims, we agree with the District Court’s
conclusion that common questions of law and fact predominate
over any individual ones, and therefore the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied.
c.  Challenges to the Plan of Allocation
Both Van Enterprises and the Iaad/Zorkess objectors
present challenges related to the Plan of Allocation, arguing that
subclasses were needed to ensure adequate representation for the
various types of policyholders and to ensure a fair allocation of
the settlement fund.  Specifically, the Iaad/Zorkess objectors
argue that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to
require the establishment of subclasses and separate
representation for the Excess and Non-Excess Claimants.27
They also contend that “no informal procedures designed to
mimic sub-classing were employed” and “the increased recovery
of one sub-class was achieved at the expense of another sub-
class’ diminished recovery.”  Van Enterprises argues that,
Although Van Enterprises argues that “[t]here is28
significant disparate treatment” between the three groups that
results from the Plan of Allocation, Van Enterprises does not
specify why the settlement is not fair, reasonable, and adequate
for any particular type of policyholder.
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because not all of the class members purchased insurance
directly from the Zurich Defendants, the class members have
antagonistic interests and should not be represented by one set
of lawyers.  Instead, according to Van Enterprises, subclasses
should have been certified and, as a result of the District Court’s
decision not to require subclasses and separate representation,
the Plan of Allocation was not fair.28
The plaintiffs respond that there are no divergent interests
among the class members because “[t]he groups for intra-class
allocation were created solely for economic reasons to provide
a fair distribution of the Settlement proceeds among the
Settlement Class Members,” and explain that “[t]he relief was
tailored to the individual policyholders’ circumstances, and the
structure of the distribution does not create intra-class conflicts.”
They contend that “[t]he Settlement Class Members are all in the
same position vis-a-vis the Zurich Defendants; they are
policyholders that were hampered by the same alleged activities
engaged in by the Zurich Defendants.”  Moreover, they defend
the Plan of Allocation by arguing that it “was prepared by Class
Counsel, with the substantial assistance of economic experts and
the Intervenor Attorneys General, in such a way as to fairly
allocate the recovery among Settlement Class Members in
accordance with Plaintiffs’ theories of potential damages in the
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Action.”  They maintain that the objectors “fail to recognize that
the Plan of Allocation is designed to reflect certain differences
in the impact of the Defendants’ conduct in certain lines of
insurance during different years.”
The attorneys general also argue that subclasses were not
necessary in this settlement and that the Plan of Allocation was
fair.  They contend that the objectors are essentially
“complain[ing] that the comparatively weak claims receive
comparatively less economic redress” and that “[t]his type of
disparity is common in class cases without establishing
subclasses.”  Additionally, the attorneys general state:  “Payment
among class members will vary depending on the type of
insurance policy they purchased, but that type of variation has
never been held to warrant subclasses, especially where the
variation in payment is based on the variations in the strength of
cases involving particular insurance products.”  The attorneys
general also assert that because “the purchasers of excess and
non-excess insurance are all known, have been noticed and are
the same persons,” this case is distinguishable from other cases
in which subclasses were required.  In sum, the attorneys general
assert that “there can be no need for subclasses where the
difference involved different claims by many of the same
persons.”
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) states that
“[w]hen appropriate, a class action may be divided into
subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”  An
advisory committee note for Rule 23(c) indicates that subclasses
are appropriate “[w]here a class is found to include subclasses
divergent in interest.”  Accordingly, “[a] district court hearing
65
a class action has the discretion to divide the class into
subclasses and certify each subclass separately.”  In re Cendant
Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have
explained that the option to utilize subclasses “is designed to
prevent conflicts of interest in class representation.”  Id.
Nonetheless, “[w]hile subclasses can be useful in preventing
conflicts of interest, they have their drawbacks.”  Id. (citing a
secondary source for the proposition that subclassing can create
a “Balkanization” of the class action and present a huge obstacle
to settlement if each subclass has an incentive to hold out for
more money).  Because “the decision whether to certify a
subclass requires a balancing of costs and benefits that can best
be performed by a district judge,” we accord substantial
deference to district courts with respect to their resolution of this
issue.  Id.; see Alexander v. Gino’s, Inc., 621 F.2d 71, 75 (3d
Cir. 1980) (noting that “the district court has considerable
discretion in utilizing subclasses” under Rule 23(c)).  Thus,
“[w]here the district court has declined to certify a subclass, we
will ordinarily defer to its decision unless it constituted an abuse
of discretion.”  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d at 202;
cf. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 316 (explaining that the
objector had “not demonstrated that [one type of] claimants
differ from other class members so as to require the creation of
a subclass,” and concluding that “[b]ecause the [one type of]
claimants did not require specialized or distinct treatment, the
court’s failure to create a separate subclass for those claimants
. . . was not an abuse of discretion”).
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that
the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to create
subclasses or require separate representation.  We acknowledge
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that the objectors’ argument that subclasses should have been
utilized has some appeal to it, given that the Plan of Allocation
divides the total settlement award on the basis of the type of
insurance, thereby creating different groups for the purpose of
reimbursement, and the groups do not have access to an equal
percentage of the fund.  But subclasses are only necessary when
members of the class have divergent interests and the District
Court found that no such divergent interests existed between the
allocation groups.  The District Court explained that the
objectors
“failed to raise, let alone describe, any divergent
or antagonistic interests between the three groups,
as is required in order for subclasses to be
mandated. Instead, [the objectors] state[] without
explanation that these groups have ‘claims of
varying merit’ – a statement that appears to have
been derived entirely from the fact that the
Settlement’s plan of allocation has chosen to
distribute different percentages of the settlement
monies to these groups.”
Zurich Settlement Final Approval Opinion at *18 (citation
omitted).  The District Court reasoned that simply because the
relief varied among the different groups of class members did
not demonstrate that there were conflicting or antagonistic
interests within the class.  The District Court’s analysis of the
adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a) provides
additional support for its conclusion that there are no divergent
interests among the class members.  In this context, the District
Court found that
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“it is clear that the named Plaintiffs’ interests are
not antagonistic to those of the absent class
members.  The central questions in this case
regarding the Zurich Defendants’ alleged conduct,
and the impact of that conduct on both the named
Plaintiffs and the absent class members, animates
in an identical fashion the claims of both
groups. . . .  Plaintiffs have advocated as
vigorously for the absent class members as they
have for themselves.”
Id. at *15.
Moreover, on appeal, the objectors still fail to articulate
how the interests of the various members are divergent, and
instead they continue to point to the fact that the fund was
allocated in such a way that a greater percentage of the
settlement value is designated for class members who purchased
excess insurance during certain years.  However, this is simply
a reflection of the extent of the injury that certain class members
incurred and does not clearly suggest that the class members had
antagonistic interests.  Additionally, as the attorneys general
emphasized at oral argument, many of the Settlement Class
Members are both Excess and Non-Excess policyholders and
will be entitled to recover damages for overpayment of
premiums for both types of insurance.  This illustrates that the
Plan of Allocation did not create de facto subclasses among the
class members but merely created a structure for ensuring that
reimbursement is tied to the extent of damages incurred on
certain policies of insurance.  This method for distributing the
fund, in which individuals and entities may have claims that
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span several of the allocation groups, did not produce a
divergence of interests among the class members.  Rather,
regardless of the type of insurance at issue and the time period
during which it was purchased, all of the class members shared
a unified interest in establishing the Zurich Defendants’ liability
for engaging in anticompetitive conduct which increased the
cost of premiums for all policyholders.
Additionally, the District Court found that the Zurich
Settlement Agreement and the Plan of Allocation were fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and in support of this finding credited
the representation of the attorneys general that the Plan of
Allocation “accurately reflects differences in the impact of the
Defendants’ conduct in certain lines of insurance during
different years.”  Id. at *11.  As the plaintiffs explained in their
memorandum in support of their motion for final approval of the
settlement,
“[f]or each group of claimants, the distributable
amount from the Combined Settlement Amount
will be calculated by dividing the premium paid
by each claimant for the applicable policies by the
total premiums paid by all claimants. . . .  With
respect to any Settlement Class Policy Purchase,
no Conspiracy Claimant can recover a higher
percentage of the premium paid than that
recovered by an Excess Claimant or a Non-Excess
Claimant.  In addition, to the extent that any of the
Combined Settlement Amount allocable to the
Conspiracy Claimants is not distributed, that
remaining amount shall be reallocated to the
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Excess Claimants and the Non-Excess Claimants,
with 62.7% allocated to the Excess Claimants,
and 37.3% allocated to the Non-Excess
Claimants.”
(Zurich App. 2906.)  This information further demonstrates that
the Plan of Allocation was carefully devised to ensure a fair
distribution of the settlement fund to the various types of
claimants and was allocated in such a way that policyholders
who likely incurred the most damage are entitled to a larger
proportion of the recovery than those whose injuries were less
severe.  Even if some potential benefits may have been realized
from utilizing subclasses, it is not at all clear that the advantages
would have outweighed the disadvantages, and therefore it is
difficult to say that the District Court abused its discretion by
not taking this step.  Consequently, we conclude that the District
Court’s decision not to certify separate subclasses or require
separate representation did not constitute an abuse of discretion
and likewise its approval of the Zurich Settlement Agreement
and Plan of Allocation was also within its discretion.
C.  Challenges to the Approval
of the Gallagher Settlement
1.  The District Court’s Analysis
In the Gallagher Settlement, the District Court utilized
the same approach it used in approving the Zurich Settlement
with respect to the Rule 23 requirements for approving class
action settlements.  The District Court addressed the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and concluded that the existence of
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over 288,000 potential class members “easily satisfies the
numerosity requirement [of subsection (a)(1)], as numbers in
excess of forty, particularly those exceeding one hundred or one
thousand have sustained the requirement”; the commonality
requirement of subsection (a)(2) was “clearly satisfied” because
of the “many common questions of law and fact”; the typicality
requirement of subsection (a)(3) was met because “the claims
made by named Plaintiffs and those made on behalf of the
Settlement Class Members are indistinguishable, encompassing
identical allegations” and such claims arose “in each case from
the same course of action taken by the Gallagher Defendants”;
and the adequacy of representation requirement of subsection
(a)(4) was met because Class Counsel were “clearly well
qualified and experienced class action attorneys who have been
involved in similar . . . litigation around the country,” and
because “it is clear that the named Plaintiffs’ interests are not
antagonistic to those of the absent class members.”  Gallagher
Settlement Final Approval Opinion at *9-11 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
With respect to Rule 23(b)(3), the District Court
concluded that the predominance requirement was met because
“the identical claims of both the named Plaintiffs and the absent
class members arise from the same set of facts regarding the
alleged collusive and anticompetitive behavior of the Gallagher
Defendants.”  Id. at *12.  The District Court also determined
that the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was satisfied
by the class action in light of the presence of more than 288,000
potential class members and millions of pages of documents,
which, according to the District Court, made it “more desirable”
The supplemental Prudential factors relevant here also29
weigh in favor of the Gallagher Settlement.  See supra note 17
(quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 323) (noting
factors that may be appropriate to consider in addition to the
ones enumerated in Girsh).  Prior to the settlement, “[c]ounsel
for the Plaintiffs obtained approximately 70 million pages of
documents from various defendants and third parties, including
roughly 1.4 million pages of documents and volumes of data
from the Gallagher defendants alone.  During this period,
Plaintiffs’ counsel also met and conferred with defense counsel
numerous times and conducted approximately 181 depositions
in connection with the action.”  Gallagher Settlement Final
Approval Opinion at *2 (citation omitted).  Accordingly,
counsel had an extensive opportunity to assess the merits of the
case.  In addition, class members had a right to opt out, and
some did so.  See id. at *5.  The objectors do not dispute the
fairness of the award of attorneys’ fees on appeal, but the
District Court approved it as fair and reasonable, and we find no
reason to doubt its judgment.  Nor do we see cause to dispute
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to litigate these claims in one action, rather than in “numerous,
separate actions litigating the same issue.”  Id. at *13.
The District Court also concluded that the Settlement
Agreement satisfied Rule 23(e) because the agreement was fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  The District Court reached this
conclusion after analyzing each of the Girsh factors and
determining that the first five factors “overwhelmingly weigh in
favor of approval of settlement” and the final four factors
“weigh slightly or moderately in favor of approval.”  Id. at *4.29
the fairness of the claims-processing procedure.  See id. at *15
(rejecting objections to the proposed claim form).
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Prior to certifying the class and approving the Gallagher
Settlement Agreement, the District Court addressed and rejected
the challenges raised by the two objectors.
2.  Van Enterprises’ Arguments on Appeal
As previously mentioned, Van Enterprises is the only
objector-appellant with respect to the Gallagher Settlement.
Van Enterprises presents nearly identical challenges to the
District Court’s approval of the Gallagher Settlement as it did
with respect to the Zurich Settlement, arguing that the named
plaintiffs lack standing, the Settlement Class is overbroad and
the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) were not
satisfied, and the Plan of Allocation is not fair.
a.  Challenges to the Plaintiffs’ Standing
Unlike the Zurich Settlement, Van Enterprises did object
in writing to the Gallagher Settlement on the basis of the named
plaintiffs’ lack of standing, and therefore these arguments were
considered by the District Court.  The District Court found that
“[t]he named Plaintiffs here have sufficiently alleged injury in
fact – artificially inflated insurance premiums – as a result of the
Gallagher Defendants’ participation in the alleged customer
allocation scheme and other alleged conduct,” and that, as a
result, “unnamed Plaintiffs in the class need not make a separate
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showing of injury in fact, and standing is not an obstacle to
certification for the class for settlement purposes.”  Id. at *14.
Van Enterprises contends that “the named plaintiffs do
not allege and have not shown that any of their policies were
subject to the improper use of contingent commission
agreements” and that “[n]one of the named plaintiffs claim that
the receipt of contingent commissions caused any broker to steer
them to a policy that cost more than it should have.” Van
Enterprises argues that, at best, the plaintiffs assert that they
have standing because “the Insurer Defendants ‘passed through’
their payments of contingent commission to all of their insureds,
regardless of the geographic area or the line of commercial
insurance” and that this amounts to a non-particularized and
conjectural allegation of injury.
The defendants respond that Van Enterprises’ arguments
are unavailing because “three different named class members
purchased insurance coverage through Gallagher that included
policies issued by Defendant Insurers who had entered into
contingent commission agreements with Gallagher,” and “these
named plaintiffs were individually harmed by the existence of
undisclosed contingent commissions.”  The plaintiffs add that
“because the Settlement Class is limited to those policyholders
with a ‘direct and immediate relationship’ to a Broker Defendant
co-conspirator in this Action, and because all Settlement Class
Members purchased insurance at prices elevated by Defendants’
unlawful scheme, all members of the Settlement Class have
standing and have been injured by the anticompetitive conduct
described in the Complaints.”  The plaintiffs also contend that
they “have suffered immediate concrete economic harm – an
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out-of-pocket cost – at the point they purchased their insurance
policies through the Broker Defendants.”
Because the plaintiffs alleged that several of the named
plaintiffs utilized the Gallagher Defendants’ brokerage services
in order to obtain insurance and that the plaintiffs suffered
economic harm in the form of higher premiums as a result of the
defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, the named plaintiffs have
standing for purposes of the class certification.  The allegations
demonstrate that the named plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact
that is concrete and particularized and which was proximately
caused by the actions of the Gallagher Defendants, and this is
sufficient to establish their standing.  We do not need to assess
the merits of the plaintiffs’ argument that, having purchased
insurance at higher prices, all of the class members have
standing, because the critical question is whether the named
plaintiffs who were actually before the District Court had
standing irrespective of whether each absent class member could
establish standing.  The named plaintiffs only needed to allege
that they suffered an injury in fact and were not required to
prove the merits of their case against the Gallagher Defendants
to establish standing.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District
Court correctly determined that the named plaintiffs had
standing and that the case could proceed.
b.  Challenges to Class Certification
Van Enterprises’ challenges to the certification of the
Gallagher Settlement Class mimic its challenges to the
certification of the Zurich Settlement Class.  In general terms,
Van Enterprises argues:  “A review of the pleadings, RICO
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statement, orders of dismissal and arguments and evidence
submitted by the Settling Parties in favor of certifying this
Settlement Class make clear that this incredibly broad
Settlement Class does not meet the requirements of Rule 23.”
More specifically, Van Enterprises contends that the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met
because “common questions did not predominate for the
antitrust claims” and “antitrust impact or injury could not be
shown with common proof.”  As for the RICO claims, Van
Enterprises argues the predominance requirement is not met
because “there were not standard, uniform misrepresentations to
the class” and it was questionable “whether any violation of
RICO caused loss to the class.”  Van Enterprises also argues that
the District Court, by “appl[ying] the commonality standard of
[Rule] 23(a)(2) to determine whether questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members,” used the incorrect
legal standard in making its Rule 23(b)(3) determination.  As
these challenges were preserved in Van Enterprises’ written
objection, we will consider each of them in turn.
Although Van Enterprises’ arguments are primarily
focused on the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), we
will briefly address the commonality and typicality requirements
of Rule 23(a) as it specifically challenged these requirements in
its written objection.  The District Court found that the
commonality requirement was satisfied because “there are many
common questions of law and fact,” listing, among others,
questions such as whether “the Gallagher Defendants entered
into a contract, combination or conspiracy to allocate the market
for sale of insurance” and whether “the Gallagher Defendants
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engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.”  Gallagher
Settlement Final Approval Opinion at *10.  Because the
commonality requirement is “satisfied if the named plaintiffs
share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of
the prospective class,” Newton, 259 F.3d at 183 (internal
quotation marks omitted), we do not discern any error in the
District Court’s finding that the commonality requirement was
satisfied.  As for the typicality requirement, the District Court
found that
“the claims made by named Plaintiffs and those
made on behalf of the Settlement Class Members
are indistinguishable, encompassing identical
allegations that the Gallagher Defendants violated
RICO, federal and state antitrust laws, and the
common law obligations.  These claims arise in
each case from the same course of action taken by
the Gallagher Defendants.  Consequently, the
named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those
brought by the Settlement Class Members at
large.”
Gallagher Settlement Final Approval Opinion at *11.  We agree
with the District Court that the claims of the named plaintiffs
and the class members stem from the conduct of the Gallagher
Defendants and that the interests of the named plaintiffs are
sufficiently aligned with the interests of the entire class such that
the typicality requirement is satisfied.  Accordingly, we discern
no error in the District Court’s finding on this Rule 23(a)
requirement of class certification.
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Turning to Van Enterprises’ challenge to the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the District Court
provided a nearly verbatim analysis of this element in its
Gallagher Settlement opinion as it did in its Zurich Settlement
opinion.  The District Court noted that in order to satisfy this
element of Rule 23(b)(3) “parties must do more than merely
demonstrate a ‘common interest in a fair compromise’; instead,
they must provide evidence that the proposed class is
‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.’”  Id. at *12 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623).
The District Court referred back to its Rule 23(a) commonality
analysis in which it identified the following issues as being
common to the class:
“whether: (1) the Gallagher Defendants entered
into a contract, combination or conspiracy to
allocate the market for sale of insurance; (2) the
Gallagher Defendants’ contract, combination or
conspiracy had the purpose and effect of reducing
and unreasonably restraining competition in the
sale of insurance; (3) the Gallagher Defendants’
conduct violated § 1 of the Sherman Act; (4) the
Gallagher Defendants engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity; and (5) the Gallagher
Defendants violated RICO.”
Id. at *10.
However, one notable difference between the District
Court’s analysis of predominance in the Gallagher Settlement in
contrast to its discussion of this requirement in the Zurich
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Settlement is that the District Court was able to specifically
address Van Enterprises’ challenge to the predominance
requirement because Van Enterprises had provided a more
thorough explanation of its objection in its written submission
to the District Court.  Thus the District Court noted that Van
Enterprises objected to the following:  “[W]hether any antitrust
injury is common to the class; whether Plaintiffs can show a
uniform fraudulent representation sufficient to certify a RICO
class; and whether common unjust enrichment issues
predominate throughout the class.”  Id. at *14.  Notwithstanding
the reasons for Van Enterprises’ objection, the District court
determined: “[N]amed Plaintiffs and absent class members are
asserting identical claims that arise from the same set of facts
regarding collusive and anticompetitive behavior of the
Gallagher Defendants.  Consistent with the law of the Third
Circuit, this satisfies the commonality requirement of [Rule]
23(a).”  Id.
While we acknowledge that the District Court was
imprecise when it referred to Rule 23(a) at this point of its
analysis, as opposed to Rule 23(b)(3), it is clear from the entirety
of the District Court’s discussion that it was assessing whether
the predominance component of Rule 23(b)(3) was satisfied.
Similarly, at another point in its discussion, the District Court
referred to “the commonality requirement of [Rule] 23(b)(3)” as
opposed to the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  Id.
Although it is appropriate to consider the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a) together with the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), see In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d at 528, district courts must take care
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not to conflate the terminology because doing so results in
confusion and may undermine the district court’s conclusions.
Therefore, to ensure that the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3) was satisfied, we will briefly analyze whether
common questions of law and fact predominate over individual
ones with respect to the plaintiffs’ federal antitrust and RICO
claims.  As we discussed in the context of the Zurich Settlement,
because the first and third elements of a Sherman Act violation
focus on the conduct of the defendants, it is not difficult to
identify common questions relevant to establishing these
elements, such as whether the Gallagher Defendants agreed with
any of the Insurer Defendants to steer customers to those
insurers in exchange for the payment of contingent
commissions, whether the Gallagher Defendants conspired with
any Insurer Defendants to reduce competition in the insurance
market by soliciting non-competitive bids, whether the
Gallagher Defendants agreed with other Broker Defendants to
share their contingent commission arrangements with each other
but not to disclose these arrangements to their customers,
whether the Gallagher Defendants actually engaged in collusive
actions with other Broker Defendants as opposed to merely
taking unilateral actions in their own best interest, whether any
of the Gallagher Defendants’ agreements constituted horizontal
restraints of trade, and whether the Gallagher Defendants
succeeded at allocating their business among a select group of
insurers in restraint of trade.  Common questions that are
relevant to the second element of a Sherman Act violation
include whether the Gallagher Defendants’ actions reduced
competition for insurance, whether the Gallagher Defendants’
actions resulted in an allocation of customers and a
80
consolidation of the insurance market, and whether the
Gallagher Defendants’ actions caused an increase in the cost of
premiums for insurance.  As for the fourth element, we likewise
conclude that there are common questions relevant to proving
antitrust injury.  The plaintiffs alleged that premiums throughout
the insurance industry were artificially inflated as a result of the
contingent commission agreements and other allegedly
anticompetitive practices that the Gallagher Defendants engaged
in.  Based on this theory, antitrust injury is susceptible to proof
on a class-wide basis and involves common questions.
Turning to the plaintiffs’ RICO claim, many of the same
common questions that we identified in the context of the Zurich
Settlement are also relevant here.  The first element of a RICO
violation involves the common question of whether the
Gallagher Defendants participated or engaged in conduct with
other Insurer Defendants and Broker Defendants.  The second
element, whether an enterprise existed, also involves common
questions of law and fact, such as whether the Broker
Defendants and Insurer Defendants were part of an association
in fact or whether they formed an enterprise through the legally
recognized Counsel of Insurance Agents and Brokers.
Similarly, the third and fourth elements involve common
questions of law and fact as well, including whether the
enterprise was being used to commit mail or wire fraud, or other
acts that constitute racketeering, and whether such activities
occurred often enough to establish a pattern.  Again, we
recognize that establishing liability under RICO also requires
demonstrating that the plaintiffs suffered an injury to their
property or business, which may require individual proof in
some cases, but in this case the plaintiffs’ “premium buildup”
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theory lends itself to proof on a class-wide basis.  In sum, we
conclude that, because the essential elements of the plaintiffs’
federal claims involve common questions of law and fact, such
common questions predominate over any individual ones, and
Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied.
c.  Challenges to the Plan of Allocation
Van Enterprises also contends that separate subclasses
should have been certified to ensure adequate representation and
a fair allocation of the settlement.  Van Enterprises argues that
the six categories of claimants among whom the settlement fund
is allocated are subject to disparate treatment and that
antagonistic interests exist between these groups.  As an initial
matter, we note that Van Enterprises made only a passing
reference to the use of subclasses in its written objection to the
Gallagher Settlement, which falls far short of the “sufficient
specificity” standard of presenting an issue for consideration
before the District Court in order to preserve it for appeal.
Keenan, 983 F.2d at 471; accord Shell Petroleum, 182 F.3d at
218.  Van Enterprises also failed to substantiate its argument
that the Plan of Allocation was unfair, other than to state that
“there is significant disparate treatment” of the six claimant
groups.  Nonetheless, to the extent that Van Enterprises’
arguments contest the adequacy of representation – a challenge
which it did preserve in its written objection – we will consider
all of these arguments on appeal.
The District Court found that Van Enterprises’ challenge
to the Plan of Allocation was actually a challenge to the
certification of the class because Van Enterprises’ arguments
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related to the adequacy of representation as opposed to the
fairness of the amounts of the fund that were allotted to each
group of claimants.  See Gallagher Settlement Final Approval
Opinion at *9.  We agree with the District Court that Van
Enterprises did not raise any substantive challenges to the Plan
of Allocation, nor does it articulate any such challenge on
appeal.  Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s
conclusion that the Settlement Agreement and the Plan of
Allocation satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(e).
Addressing Van Enterprises’ challenges in the context of
the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a), the
District Court found that there were not any antagonistic
interests among the Class Members.  Specifically, the District
Court determined:
“Here, it is clear that the named Plaintiffs’
interests are not antagonistic to those of the absent
class members.  The central questions in this case
regarding the Gallagher Defendants’ alleged
conduct, and the impact of that conduct on both
the named Plaintiffs and the absent class
members, animates in an identical fashion the
claims of both groups.  [I]n addressing these
common questions, the named Plaintiffs have
advocated as vigorously for the absent class
members as they have for themselves.”
Id. at *11.  The District Court found that the named plaintiffs
did not have any divergent or conflicting interests with the
absent class members and were therefore adequate
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representatives of the class, and we discern no error in this
finding.  Moreover, in the absence of divergent interests among
the class members, we conclude that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion by choosing not to utilize subclasses.
D.  Challenge to the Attorneys’
Fees in the Zurich Settlement
1.  Standards for Approving Attorneys’ Fees
Requests for awards of attorneys’ fees in a class action
settlement may be presented as either a percentage of the total
recovery of a common fund or as a dollar amount that is not
derivative of the settlement value.  When a percentage of the
total recovery of the settlement is requested, we have articulated
several factors that a district court should consider for assessing
the reasonableness of the fee.  See Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy
Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).  The Gunter factors are as
follows:
“(1) the size of the fund created and the number
of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence
of substantial objections by members of the class
to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by
counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the
attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and
duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to
the case by plaintiffs’ counsel; and (7) the awards
in similar cases.”
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Id. at 195 n.1.  These factors “need not be applied in a formulaic
way . . . and in certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest.”
Id.  We have instructed district courts that they are “to engage in
robust assessments of the fee award reasonableness factors when
evaluating a fee request.”  In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396
F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2005).
The alternative to requesting a percentage of the total
recovery is to request a particular dollar amount in connection
with class counsel’s lodestar.
“The lodestar award is calculated by multiplying
the number of hours reasonably worked on a
client’s case by a reasonable hourly billing rate
for such services based on the given geographical
area, the nature of the services provided, and the
experience of the attorneys.  The multiplier is a
device that attempts to account for the contingent
nature or risk involved in a particular case and the
quality of the attorneys’ work.”
Id. at 305-06 (footnote omitted).  The reasonableness of the
requested fee can be assessed by calculating the lodestar
multiplier, which is equal to the proposed fee award divided by
the lodestar (i.e., the product of the total hours and the blended
billing rate).  But the lodestar “multiplier need not fall within
any pre-defined range, provided that the District Court’s
analysis justifies the award.”  Id. at 307.
“The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored
in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees
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from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards counsel for success and
penalizes it for failure.’”  Id. at 300 (quoting In re Prudential
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 333).  “The lodestar method is more
typically applied in statutory fee-shifting cases,” but
“[r]egardless of the method chosen, we have suggested it is
sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval to
cross-check its initial fee calculation.”  Id.  When the lodestar
method is used only as a cross-check, it is appropriate to apply
an abridged analysis, but courts should still “explain how the
application of a multiplier is justified by the facts of a particular
case.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 340-41.  “The
lodestar cross-check serves the purpose of alerting the trial
judge that when the multiplier is too great, the court should
reconsider its calculation under the percentage-of-recovery
method, with an eye toward reducing the award.”  In re Rite Aid
Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d at 306.
2.  The District Court’s Analysis
The District Court began its analysis by calculating the
percentage of recovery that Class Counsel’s fee request
represented, analogizing the fee request to a common fund case.
The District Court explained that according to Class Counsel,
the $29,950,000 fee award was 23% of the minimum recovery
attributable to their efforts or, alternatively, if expenses and
incentive awards were subtracted from the total award, then the
attorneys’ fee would amount to 19.9% of the minimum recovery.
See Zurich Settlement Attorneys’ Fees Opinion at *2.  Class
Counsel claimed – and the District Court accepted for the
purposes of this calculation – that they deserved credit for the
$100,000,000 settlement fund established under the MOU and
86
the $29,950,000 for fees and expenses, for a combined total of
$129,950,000.  Id.  The District Court acknowledged that “this
Settlement is not strictly a common fund,” but reasoned that the
appropriate analysis “is analogous to that performed to the
common fund doctrine.”  Id. at *3.
The District Court proceeded to analyze each of the
Gunter factors, at times applying some of the same reasoning it
used in approving the Zurich Settlement Agreement under the
Girsh factors.  The District Court concluded that the first factor
– the size of the fund created and the number of persons
benefitted – weighed in favor of approval because “Class
Counsel were able to obtain a sizeable result, $121,800,000, on
behalf of the Class.”  Id. at *4.  The District Court also
referenced the number of people who would benefit from the
Settlement Agreement and the fact that the Settlement
Agreement would not be reduced by awarding attorneys’ fees
and expenses.  Id.  The District Court determined that the second
factor – the presence or absence of substantial objections by
members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees
requested by counsel – weighed in favor of approval due to the
“small number of objections . . . [and the lack of] merits of those
objections.”  Id. at *6.  The District Court relied on the same
reasoning it used in its Girsh analysis to conclude that the third
and fourth factors were satisfied – the skill and efficiency of the
attorneys involved and the complexity and duration of the
litigation.  See id.
The District Court found that the fifth factor – the risk of
non-payment – weighed in favor of approval because “Class
Counsel invested a substantial amount of time and effort to
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reach this point and obtain the favorable Settlement” and “Class
Counsel accepted the responsibility of prosecuting this class
action on a contingent fee basis and without any guarantee of
success or award.”  Id. at *7.  As for the sixth factor – the
amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs’ counsel – the
District Court determined that it also weighed in favor of
approval due to the large amount of time (200,000 hours prior
to settlement), money (aggregate lodestar of nearly $74,000,000
and expenses of nearly $4,000,000), and effort put forth by
many firms (approximately fifty law firms).  See id.  Finally, the
District Court determined that the award requested by Class
Counsel (either 23% or 19.9%) was reasonable because it was
on par with amounts previously awarded in similar settlement
cases in the District of New Jersey and it was within the range
of privately negotiated contingent fees for commercial litigation.
See id. at *7-8.  Consequently, the District Court concluded that
“the requested fee by Class Counsel is fair and reasonable
according to the Gunter factors.”  Id. at *8.
In addition to considering the percentage of recovery in
the context of the Gunter factors, the District Court also
performed a lodestar cross-check and calculated the lodestar
multiplier by using Class Counsel’s proposed fee award of
$29,950,000, and dividing that number by the value of the
lodestar that Class Counsel claimed for its work through July 31,
2006 (the approximate time when the Zurich Settlement
Agreement was reached).  See id. at *9.  The District Court
accepted the total number of hours submitted by Class Counsel
and explained that it “may rely on summaries submitted by the
attorneys, and is not required to scrutinize every billing record.”
Id.  The District Court also noted that “Class Counsel did not
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provide declarations in support of any particular hourly rate,”
but based on the District Court’s own calculation (which it
arrived at by dividing the total lodestar by the total hours
worked), “[i]t appears that the hourly rate being used by Class
Counsel is approximately $365.”  Id. at *10.  The District Court
considered this rate reasonable based on Class Counsel’s
experience and the lack of objections to the rate.  Id.  The
District Court’s calculation produced a lodestar multiplier of
0.4, which the District Court stated was “within an accepted
range.”  Id. at *9.
Before concluding its analysis, the District Court also
addressed the five objections raised to Class Counsel’s fee
request.  First, the District Court rejected the claim that the value
of Class Counsel to class members was lower due to the
participation of several attorneys general, stating that “[b]ased
on details of the Settlement Agreements, it does not appear that
Class Counsel has run afoul of [the Third] Circuit’s prohibition
of collecting fees based on the work of governmental agencies.”
Id. at *5.  Next, relying on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983), the District Court rejected the claim that Class Counsel
was seeking to recover fees based on non-Zurich Settlement
related issues, explaining that “there are situations where ‘the
plaintiff’s claims for relief will involve a common core of facts
or will be based on related legal theories’ and that ‘[m]uch of
counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a
whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a
claim-by-claim basis.’”  Zurich Settlement Attorneys’ Fees
Opinion at *5 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).  The District
Court also rejected the objections that Class Counsel failed to
perform their gatekeeper function and that the fees requested
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were too high, finding both objections “not persuasive.”  Id. at
*6.  The District Court finally rejected the objection that the
$10,000 class representation fee was too high, stating that “the
Objectors fail to put forth any authority to support this
argument.”  Id.  Relying on its Gunter analysis, which involved
calculating the percentage of recovery, and its lodestar cross-
check, the District Court approved Class Counsel’s requested
attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of expenditures, and incentive
awards for named plaintiffs.
3.  The Objectors’ Challenges on Appeal
The Iaad/Zorkess objectors argue that the District Court
abused its discretion when it awarded $29,950,000 in attorneys’
fees and costs to Class Counsel because the District Court
“overestimated the settlement funds created solely by Class
Counsel, included time in Class Counsel’s lodestar that was
spent pursuing unsuccessful litigation, and failed to exclude
from the lodestar calculation clearly excessive time
submissions.”  In particular, these objectors argue that “Zurich
class counsel can take credit for no more than $70 million of the
overall settlement,” because although the MOU secured
$100,000,000 for a settlement fund, “class counsel were
eventually forced to cede $29,900,000 to the Three-State
Settlement in order to make the overall deal work.”  Moreover,
they assert that because “57% of the Settlement Fund [goes] to
the Excess Claimants represented by the various attorneys
general . . . only 43% of the $70 million balance of the MOU
monies, or $30 million, will be paid to the clients of the Zurich
class counsel.”  Thus they argue that the attorneys’ fees awarded
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to Class Counsel represent far too high a percentage of the total
settlement value that Class Counsel’s efforts secured.
With respect to the calculation of the lodestar, the
Iaad/Zorkess objectors argue that “there is no justification for
Class Counsel’s inclusion of all of the time spent to date in this
consolidated case in support of their requested fee in the
settlement of only one small portion of the overall MDL
litigation.”  Accordingly, these objectors contend that the
District Court should not have allowed Class Counsel to “merely
summarize[] the time and expenses of each of the 44 law firms
that claimed to have performed work that contributed to the
Zurich settlement.”  Additionally, they argue that Class Counsel
abused their gatekeeper function with respect to allocating work
in such a way that promotes efficiency, and moreover that the
“amount of time claimed by certain firms . . . raises the
possibility of fraud.”
In response, the plaintiffs argue that they executed the
MOU with the Zurich Defendants “seven months before Zurich
settled with the Attorneys General and other regulators,” and
that “it was a requirement under the MOU . . . that Zurich settle
with the Attorneys General” and therefore Class Counsel played
a critical role in the settlement.  They also contend that “[t]he
argument that Class Counsel can only recover for time spent on
Zurich, moreover, ignores the reality that Class Counsel’s
efforts cannot be compartmentalized, as a number of their
actions against all the Defendants provide a benefit to the Class
and clearly had a bearing on the Zurich Defendants’ interest in
and willingness to settle.”  With respect to the objectors’ time
calculation challenge, the plaintiffs argue that “even if one
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assumed there was some duplication,” the award was not
excessive because it was “a fraction of Class Counsel’s total
lodestar.”  In sum, the plaintiffs argue that “since the requested
fee amount is no more than a fraction of the total lodestar to
date, and the requested fee and expense award is not being paid
out of the common settlement fund, there is especially little risk
here that firms will somehow benefit from inefficient billing
practices, or that the Class will in any way be harmed by the
requested award.”
The Zurich Defendants do not take a position as to the
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees; however, they do point out
that under the terms of the Zurich Settlement Agreement, “if the
Fees and Expenses award is reduced, as the Objectors seek,
Class Counsel must reimburse the Zurich Defendants that
amount, with interest.”  The intervenor attorneys general also
take no position relating to the payment of attorneys’ fees.
We believe that it was appropriate for the District Court
to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee award under a
percentage of recovery method even though the Zurich
Settlement is not a typical common fund.  In order to test the
reasonableness of the fee under this method, the District Court
needed to determine what amount of the total settlement value
could be attributed to the work of Class Counsel.  Although at
one point the District Court refers to Class Counsel achieving a
sizeable result of $121,800,000 for the settlement fund, it is
clear from the remainder of the District Court’s analysis that it
was crediting Class Counsel with achieving $129,950,000 of the
Settlement Fund based on the $100,000,000 secured under the
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MOU and the $29,950,000 secured under the separate fee
agreement.
It was reasonable to include the $29,950,000 amount in
the calculation of the settlement value created by Class Counsel
in order to determine the percentage of the total recovery that
the fee constitutes because in the typical common fund case,
class counsel would be awarded a percentage of the fund and the
balance would be available for the class members (e.g.,
defendants agree to pay $100,000,000 to a common fund, but
class counsel is awarded 25% of the settlement value, leaving
only $75,000,000 for the class).  Here, it is possible to view the
agreement reached between the Zurich Defendants and the
plaintiffs (absent the amount that was contributed to the
settlement fund pursuant to the Multi-State Agreement
negotiated by the attorneys general) as totaling $129,950,000
with a 23% fee award.  This is why Class Counsel asserts that
their fee request amounts to 23% of the settlement value for
which they were responsible (or 19.9%, once expenses and
incentive awards are subtracted from the total fee award).
The objectors make a colorable argument that Class
Counsel should not be allowed to take credit for the entire
$100,000,000 as set forth in the MOU because, under the terms
of the Settlement Agreement, the Zurich Defendants were
allowed to reduce the total amount that they contributed to the
class settlement fund by $29,900,000 based on the separate fund
that they were creating pursuant to the Three-State Agreement.
If Class Counsel can only take credit for $70,000,000 of the
value of the Zurich settlement fund, then the percentage-of-
recovery which Class Counsel requested is much larger.  Rather
93
than asking for approximately $30,000,000 out of $130,000,000,
Class Counsel’s request would amount to about $30,000,000 out
of $100,000,000, or 30% of the fund.  Nonetheless, we do not
believe that the District Court abused its discretion by crediting
Class Counsel with achieving the entire $100,000,000 as
provided for in the MOU, because even though nearly
$30,000,000 of this amount was separately earmarked for
distribution through the Three-State Agreement, the money still
benefitted potential Settlement Class Members in that everyone
who chose to claim under the Three-State Agreement otherwise
would have been eligible to claim under the Zurich Settlement
Agreement.  We agree with the District Court that Class
Counsel’s efforts produced at least $100,000,000 for the
Settlement Class in addition to the $29,950,000 separately
designated for their fees.
Next we consider the District Court’s lodestar analysis.
Although the District Court was only utilizing the lodestar
method as a cross-check of the reasonableness of the fee request
under the percentage-of-recovery method, it still needed to
calculate the lodestar multiplier correctly in order for the cross-
check to be meaningful.  Initially, despite the objectors’
arguments to the contrary, it was not error for the District Court
to rely on time summaries instead of reviewing actual time
records.  See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d at 306-07;
In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 342.  Although Class
Counsel did not disclose the billing rate they used to calculate
their lodestar, the District Court had enough information to
conclude that the blended billing rate was approximately $365,
and the District Court considered this a “reasonable hourly
billing rate for such services based on the given geographical
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area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of
the attorneys.”  Zurich Settlement Attorneys’ Fees Opinion at *8
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We have no reason to
believe this finding was in error and, because the District Court
was in the best position to make this assessment, we defer to its
reasonable judgment.
The lodestar multiplier that the District Court calculated
was less than one and thus reveals that Class Counsel’s fee
request constitutes only a fraction of the work that they billed in
conjunction with the Zurich Settlement Agreement.  Even
assuming there was some inflation of the hours billed in relation
to the Zurich Settlement or some duplicative work involved in
the total hours count, a significant adjustment would have to be
made to the hours calculation before the lodestar multiplier
(here, a fraction) would even begin to approach one.  While
district courts must be aware of the potential for manipulation of
the lodestar and lodestar multiplier, we are satisfied that in the
present case the District Court’s lodestar cross-check confirmed
the reasonableness of the fee request.  Additionally, the District
Court’s analysis of the Gunter factors was well-reasoned and
thorough and therefore further supports the conclusion that the
District Court’s award of fees was not an abuse of discretion.
IV.  Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the orders
of the District Court granting final approval of the Zurich
Settlement and the Gallagher Settlement and approving the
motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the Zurich Settlement.
